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Abstract 
The Yukos affair, a high-profile story of the state-led assault on a private Russian company, 
provides an excellent opportunity for an inquiry into the nature of company-specific political 
risks in emerging markets. News associated primarily with law enforcement agencies’ actions 
against company’s managers, not formally related to the company itself, caused significant 
negative abnormal returns for Yukos. The results are robust and not driven by a few major 
events, such as the arrests of Yukos’ top managers and shareholders. Stocks of less transparent 
private Russian companies have been more sensitive to Yukos-related events, especially 
employee-related charges by law enforcement agencies. The situation was different for less 
transparent government-owned companies such as the world-largest natural gas producer 
Gazprom: they appear to be significantly less sensitive to these events.  Actions of regulatory 
agencies have had predominantly industry-wide impact, whereas law-enforcement agencies’ 
actions affected shares of large private companies, especially those privatized in the notorious 
loans-for-shares privatization auctions. 
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1.  Introduction 
Political risk is a salient feature of emerging markets.
1 However, finance scholars focus 
predominantly on country-specific risks (e.g., Eichengreen and Mody, 1998, Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998, and Mei, 1999, Clark and Tunaru, 2000, Azam, Bates, and 
Biais, 2004).
2 The Yukos affair, a highly publicized story of the government-led assault on a 
private Russian company owned by a small group of politically ambitious individuals, provides a 
unique opportunity to uncover the hidden link between politics and finance at the company level 
(see Fisman, 2001, and Johnson and Mitton, 2002).  
Formally, the initial criminal charges brought against the major shareholders and top 
managers of Yukos had no direct link to the company.
3 Yet, the market capitalization of Yukos 
decreased dramatically after its managers’ arrests and other actions of the government agencies 
against the company and its employees. Moreover, stock prices of other Russian companies 
reacted strongly to Yukos’ events, despite repeated re-assurance of various Russian officials, 
including President Putin, that there will be no other action on the same blueprint.  
Recent studies of political connections of businessmen in Russia (Desai, Dyck, and 
Zingales, 2004, Frye, 2005, Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005, Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004, Sonin, 2003) 
or elsewhere (Faccio, 2004, Fisman, 2001, Johnson and Mitton, 2002, Morck, Stangeland, and 
Yeung, 2000, Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2004) have concentrated on their political impact 
on protection of property rights, which has often been negative. We, instead, return to a classic 
view on the main source that threatens property rights of private entrepreneurs: the state.
4 
However, unlike e.g. Azam, Bates, and Biais (2004), we focus not on establishing the fact that 
                                                 
1  Political risks most usually include nationalization or expropriation, currency and exchange controls, 
regulation and tax regime, and general instability, e.g. caused by terrorism. A legal scholar defines political risk as 
one that is “associated with business or investment in a country which would not be present in another country with 
a more stable and developed business and economic climate and regulatory regime” (Hill, 1998). For an early 
political-science perspective of financial risks associated with politics, see LaPalombara (1982). 
2 Earlier studies include Ekern (1971), Eaton and Turnovsky (1983), Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989), 
Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996), Bailey and Chung (1995), and Clark (1997). 
3 Sufficient to say, Standard & Poor’s, a leading international rating agency, has left Yukos' ratings 
(ВВ/Stable; ruAA+) unchanged in the days following its CEO jailing. The agency’s statement that circulated after 
Michail Khodorkovsky’s arrest – four months after the arrest of Platon Lebedev, the company’s chief financial 
officer – said: “The positive operational and financial indices of the company and its high liquidity protect creditors 
from the negative effects of these developments.”  
4 The modern development literature supplied a number of investigations, both theoretical and empirical, 
where the government is the main source of risk, e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Persson and Tabellini (1991), 
and Rodrik (1991).   3
state predation hinders economic development, but on the actual mechanism of a single predation 
episode. 
Frye (2005) observes that the commitment problem, emphasized in political science 
literature since the pioneering work of North and Weingast (1989) (see also Acemoglu, 2003), is 
central to understanding the negative impact of the state involvement into economic activity. 
Weingast (1993) posed the main dilemma as follows: “A government strong enough to protect 
property and enforce contracts is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” 
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2004) argued that the Russian tax code emerging since 1998 was a 
“product of a mutually beneficial exchange between the Russian government and the Russian oil 
companies”.
5 The events of the Fall of 2003 put an abrupt end to this exchange. One of the goals 
of our analysis is to study the first market reaction to a sudden change – not just in a tax regime, 
but in the whole set of institutional arrangements at the marketplace. 
Another goal of our analysis is to learn how the involvement of the state agencies affected 
stock market performance of Yukos and other Russian companies during the first months of the 
assault. We investigate in detail the Yukos stock price behavior in response to different types of 
events and examine the factors that could explain the differences in other companies’ stock price 
reaction to Yukos’ events. Our analysis is based on 53 events defined as publications in which 
Yukos has been mentioned along with one of the state agencies during a period from January 
2002 to November 2003. The choice of November 2003 as the terminal date is dictated by the 
fact that in December 3, 2003, the Ministry of Tax Affairs issued the first back-dated tax claim 
against Yukos. A year and a half later, the company practically collapsed under the burden of this 
and many other back-dated tax claims; however, the developments since November 2003 are of 
less interest to us, since the decrease in Yukos market capitalization has been now directly linked 
to the size of these tax liabilities.  
At the early stages of the affair, the tactics of the state has not yet been settled on mounting 
tax claims against Yukos; various ministries and individual government officials have been used 
during this time. Accordingly, typical events in our data-set are (threats of) penalties, threats to 
revoke the license for non-fulfillment of the conditions of an agreement, and charges for 
                                                 
5 See also Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2004) for a very different view of roles of the state and oil companies 
in determining tax enforcement institutions in Russia.   4
involvement in past privatization deals or for personal tax evasion.
6 In the first part of the paper, 
we analyze using the market model as a benchmark how news involving Yukos along with 
different types of state agencies affected the level of the company’s returns and their systematic 
risk. It appears that Yukos’ returns were mostly driven by the employee-related charges by the 
law enforcement agencies rather than charges against the company. These results are robust and 
not driven by a few major events, such as the arrests of Yukos’ top managers and shareholders. 
Then, using a sample of 25 most liquid Russian common stocks, we run pooled cross-
sectional regressions of stock returns during the event dates on the company-specific political 
risk exposures, proxied by the government ownership and the Transparency&Disclosure index 
by Standard&Poors, interacted with Yukos’ returns. We find that stock prices of less transparent 
private companies and more transparent government-owned companies are more sensitive to 
Yukos’ events, especially the employee-related charges by the law enforcement agencies. This is 
consistent with the view that these companies face a higher risk of expropriation through the use 
of such political instruments as selective tax enforcement.  
Finally, we investigate in detail the stock price behavior of two other large Russian 
companies,  Lukoil and Gazprom, in response to the company-related (i.e., their own) news 
involving state agencies as well as Yukos’ news. We find that stock returns of Lukoil, a company 
closely affiliated with the government, but still having a certain degree of independence, were 
affected both by its own negative events due to the law enforcement agencies and by Yukos 
events. In contrast, stock returns of Gazprom, a state-controlled gas monopolist, were not 
affected by Yukos events and rose in response to the involvement of the non-law-enforcement 
agencies. 
On the surface, there seems to be a similarity between high-profile cases of public 
companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat, where news about the government-led 
investigations have had a significant impact on share prices. However, these cases are starkly 
different. First, the political side of investigations into Enron and WorldCom affairs was at 
maximum marginal compared to the Yukos case (and possibly non-existent at all). In other 
words, problems of these companies were primarily related to the economic side of their 
                                                 
6 It should be stressed that most charges during the sample period were unrelated to Yukos’ own privatization 
history and business. They dealt primarily with other privatization deals in which Yukos’ individual shareholders 
had been involved.    5
business, while the Yukos problems (and respective drops in the share prices) have been caused 
by the political assault as such.  
Second, investigation announcements in the case of Enron and WorldCom have caused 
drops in the share prices since they carried out (mostly negative) information about the real state 
of affairs in the companies. In the case of Yukos, there was no negative information hidden from 
the investors’ sight; the bad news was the government assault as such. So, while the last days of 
the Enron saga is a text-book example of the impact of negative information, the Yukos story 
allows one to read the investors’ mind: in an emerging market, the personal fate of the CEO is a 
major determinant of the shareholder value. 
A more relevant analogy can be drawn with the history of the Standard Oil break-up and 
other anti-trust investigations.
7 (Bittlingmayer, 1992, analyses stock returns in anti-trust cases; 
Glaeser et al, 2003, draw parallels between large business conglomerates of the Gilded Age and 
modern Russian companies.) However, this analogy might be misleading as well. The primary 
concern of the U.S. government was restoring efficiency that was harmed by the monopoly 
position of the Standard Oil and similar companies. In contrast, even being indeed a giant 
company, Yukos still has faced stiff competition both at home, where the remaining four largest 
oil companies are actually almost as big, and abroad, where it has to compete with multinational 
majors such as Royal Dutch/Shell, Chevron, BP, etc. At the political side, some similarity stems 
from the fact that both prosecution of the Standard Oil and the attack on Yukos were directed by 
popular politicians and enjoyed significant support of the public in large.
8 
The closest paper to ours is that by Fisman (2001) studying how political connections of 
Indonesian companies affected their stock market performance in 1995. He finds that Indonesian 
firms with close ties to the Soeharto regime lost more value in response to the news on 
Soeharto’s health problems. Johnson and Mitton (2003) study an interaction between cronyism 
and capital controls in Malaysia at the time of the Asian crisis. They find that many firms with 
political connections lost valuable subsidies during the first phase of the crisis; however, some of 
                                                 
7 There is one formal similarity between Yukos (and other similar Russian companies) and the Standard Oil 
(and similar US companies of the time). Both companies were in fact trusts managing property in the interest of 
‘beneficiaries’. The reasons were somewhat different: in the Standard Oil case, the structure was designed to 
coordinate activity of a certain set of enterprises; in the Yukos case, the primary purpose was to hide true ownership 
and avoid regulation. 
8 Back in 1903, economist Gilbert Holland Montague writing for The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(Montague, 1903) concludes his evaluation: “The present position of the Standard Oil Company is one abundant of 
prosperity and power.”   6
them restored subsidies after the government imposed capital controls in September 1998. Chen 
et al. (2004) find that post-IPO underperformance of Chinese companies is largely attributable to 
the presence of politically-connected CEOs. Faccio (2004) examines the value of corporate 
connections with political officials using a comprehensive cross-country set of firms. She finds a 
significant increase in market capitalization when the company’s directors or large shareholders 
enter politics, but not when politicians become involved in business. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the chronology of 
major  Yukos’ events since its creation in 1993 and alternative interpretations of the affair. 
Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, we employ time series analysis to investigate the Yukos 
stock price behavior in response to different types of events. In section 5, we use a pooled 
regression approach to examine factors that could explain the differences in other companies’ 
stock price reaction to Yukos’ events. Section 6 presents a detailed time series analysis of the 
stock price behaviour of Lukoil and Gazprom in response to their own events and Yukos’ events 
involving state agencies. Section 7 concludes. 
2.  The Yukos Story 
The story of Yukos has been recently reported in a number of policy texts (e.g., Aron, 
2003, Hill, 2004) and newspaper articles (we use the most trusted popular sources such as the 
Economist, New York Times, Financial Times, and Washington Post). We provide the basic facts 
without going into much detail, and try to delineate the commercial side of the story, which is 
important for understanding prices for Yukos shares, and the political one, where the timeline 
provides the event sequence for our empirical investigation. 
Yukos was created by Russian government to integrate a number of parts of the former oil 
industry in April 1993, and was subsequently privatized through one of the ill-famous ‘loans-for-
shares’ auctions.
9 Frieland (2001) (see also Hoffman, 2002) provides a comprehensive and 
colorful description of the privatization auctions; anecdotal evidence of extreme forms of 
corruption in these auctions is overwhelming (e.g. Goldman, 2003; see however, Shleifer and 
Treisman, 2000, on the impossibility of another course of economic reforms).  Until the moment 
                                                 
9 The company’s name is an acronym of the names of two state-owned companies that were parts of the 
merger: Yuganskneftegaz and KuybyshevOrgSintez. On ‘loans-for-shares’ auctions see, e.g., Freeland (2000).   7
when the Yukos core shareholder group accumulated an absolute majority of shares, the fate of 
minority shareholders, including foreign institutional investors, has been miserable. 
Since 1998, however, Yukos has often been ahead of other large Russian companies in 
developing new standards of corporate governance and transparency. In 1999, Yukos became the 
first Russian major company to report by international accounting standards; in 2001, it started to 
report its quarterly financial statements according to the U.S. GAAP. The 2002 annual report 
was audited by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. In 2000, Yukos paid its almost 60,000 shareholders 
$300 million as dividends ($500 million in 2001 and $700 million in 2002), the first Russian oil 
company to do so. On August 2001, the New York Times reported “Mr. Khodorkovsky has 
concentrated on recasting Yukos to look more like a company that investors can trust.”
10 
The growth rate of the Yukos output was 17 percent in 2001, 19 percent in 2002, and 20 
percent in 2003. Since 1998, the Yukos value has grown about 1,000 percent. In September 2002, 
the Fortune magazine ranked Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the CEO and a major shareholder of 
Yukos, the first in “Global 40 Richest Under 40”. In a paper asserting at least a partial success of 
Russian economic reforms, Shleifer and Treisman (2005) use Yukos as a success story and note 
that “in 2002, Yukos invested $1.26 billion in property, plant, and equipment”, refuting the 
argument that oligarchs are just stripping assets from the company. (Guriev and Rachinsky, 
2005, demonstrated that Russian oligarch-owned companies actually invested significantly more 
than companies with any other ownership structure.) 
Of course, historically high oil prices in 1998-2003 have contributed to the increase in 
share prices. However, during these years Yukos’ value has grown much faster than that of any 
other major oil company in the world. At the time of the assault, Yukos was the largest oil 
company in Russia and conceded only to Gazprom among all Russian companies, judged by 
market capitalization (see Table 1). 
Events that started a new page in the Yukos history and attracted attention world-wide 
were the arrests of two major shareholders and founders of the company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
and Platon Lebedev in 2003. Khodorkovsky, the CEO and the largest shareholder of Yukos was 
arrested on October 25, 2003 and charged with tax evasion, fraud, forgery, and embezzlement. 
Before that, Lebedev, a major shareholder and director of the Menatep, a holding and investment 
company that owns 61 of Yukos (Khodorkovsky is also a major owner of Menatep) was arrested 
                                                 
10 The New York Times, August 18, 2001, Fortune in Hand, Russian Tries to Polish Image.   8
on July 2, 2003, and charged with embezzling state assets in the 1994 privatization of Russia's 
largest phosphate extraction and enrichment plant, Apatit. Subsequently, the prosecutor's office 
has issued additional charges against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, including "tax evasion," 
"abuse of trust," and "failure to comply with a court order;" their petitions for bail have been 
repeatedly denied since their arrest.  
Since July 2003, a number of law enforcement and regulatory agencies issued charges 
against the company. There was also a coordinated attack on Yukos core shareholders in media, 
most prominently in all the televised news. On December 2, 2003, the Ministry for Tax 
Collection informed the Prosecutor’s office that Yukos concealed at least $5 billion in taxes in 
1998-2001. Interestingly, on all the previous counts of tax-related charges, Yukos had already 
won all the trials and the Ministry had publicly agreed that there were no over-due taxes. 
Even now, a couple of years since the beginning of the Yukos affair, its “political side” is 
both very clear and mysterious, with versions ranging from a personal feud between President 
Putin and Yukos’ CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky to an ultimate battle between the evil of 
dictatorship and the angel of democracy. In particular, Yukos and its key figures have been 
allegedly financing opposition parties on a regular basis, and thus the attack might be viewed a 
part of President Putin’s strategy to eliminate any substantial political opposition to his rule. The 
New York Times editorialized on August 13, 2003: “It is not surprising that nobody knows for 
sure whether President Vladimir Putin is personally behind the sudden crackdown on the giant 
oil company Yukos, or really why it is happening. What is clear is that the Kremlin's strong-arm 
tactics have little to do with battling economic crime and a lot to do with power and the coming 
elections in Russia. They are also of little help to Russia's tenuous democracy.” Among 
evaluation of the merits of the charges after the Khodorkovsky arrest, the following one was 
typical: “The charges of fraud and income tax evasion appear to be little more than a crude 
campaign to punish Khodorkovsky and his partners.” (Washington Post, November 2, 2003).
11 
The subsequent development has confirmed this position: “Whatever the merit of the charges, no 
one doubts the prosecution is politically motivated” (Wall Street Journal Europe, September 1, 
                                                 
11 At the very early stage, prior to Mikhail Khodorkovsky arrest, media were even more cautious: “The 
crackdown on Mikhail Khodorkovsy has many causes, not least Kremlin intrigue and public anger at the wealth of 
the oligarchs.” (Financial Times, July 31, 2003); “At first, investors shrugged off the series of raids on the periphery 
of the empire of Russia's richest man, Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, as just a passing unpleasantness. Now, as the 
wrangle drags into its fourth week, investors are starting to worry.” (New York Times, July 31, 2003).   9
2003).
12 “The arrest was widely seen as a Kremlin-backed campaign to clip the political 
ambitions of Russia's richest man, who at one point considered running against President 
Vladimir V. Putin.” (New York Times, April 12, 2004). In November 2004, the Economist 
concluded that “Most think the government's persecution of Yukos, one of Russia's biggest oil 
companies—and its boss and major shareholder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky—is politically driven. 
The crackdown has scared investors, who are fleeing despite the surging oil price.” 
Another political explanation is that the new political elite, brought to the government by 
the dramatic rise of President Putin, is eager to take over the ‘crown jewels’ of the Russian 
industry. Alternatively, the destruction of one of the most prominent ‘oligarchs’, a group of very 
wealthy and politically influential businessman, might be viewed as an institutional response to 
the subversion of institutions by the rich during the first decade of reforms (Glaeser, Sheinkman, 
and Shleifer, 2003).  
3.  Description of the data  
The events analyzed in our study were selected by searching the archives of RBC news as 
well as Kommersant and Vedomosti
13 articles by keywords “Yukos” and a name of one of the 
law enforcement agencies (Prosecutor’s office, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security 
Service, and Ministry of Tax Collection) or the other government agencies (Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy, Russian Federal Property Fund, and State 
Auditing Chamber). It should be emphasized that the news was classified as an event, when it 
was initiated by the authorities and not by the company. The typical negative events are 
penalties, threats to revoke the license for the non-fulfillment of the conditions of the agreement, 
and charges for the involvement in past shady privatization deals (unrelated to Yukos) or personal 
tax evasion. Most of the positive events follow the negative ones, reducing their impact, e.g., by 
lowering the fine or removing the charges. In total, this procedure produced 11 positive and 42 
negative events for Yukos.  
In order to study the specifics of market reaction to different types of events, we divide all 
negative events into three groups: 16 employee-related news initiated by the law enforcement 
                                                 
12 "Political Prosecutions Threaten Russia's Ambitions." The Wall Street Journal Europe September 1, 2003. 
13 RBC (RosBusinessConsulting) is a leading Russian provider of business information. Kommersant and 
Vedomosti (a joint project of the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times) are two leading Russian business 
newspapers. When the newspaper article referred to the event with a lag, we adjusted the date of the event 
accordingly.   10
agencies,
14 19 company-related events involving the law enforcement agencies, and 14 
company-related events involving the non-law-enforcement agencies.
15 We do not make a 
similar division for positive events, since their number is too small and since most of them (9 out 
of 11) are initiated by the non-law-enforcement agencies. 
In addition, we gathered similar sets of positive and negative events for Gazprom and 
Lukoil, the largest and third-largest Russian companies by market capitalization at the beginning 
of 2004, respectively. Our data set comprises 30 events (including 6 positive ones) for Gazprom 
and 38 events (11 positive ones) for Lukoil. 
Our analysis of stock market reaction to Yukos events is based on daily dividend-adjusted 
returns of most liquid Russian stocks.
16 We take the S&P/RUX as a proxy for the market 
portfolio.
17 The sample period is from January 1, 2002 to November 27, 2003, including 475 
trading days. We deliberately choose November 2003 as the terminal date. It is motivated by the 
fact that in December 3, 2003, the Ministry of Tax Affairs made the first official statement that 
Yukos had evaded taxes and owed a certain amount to the state, which directly affected the value 
of the company. During the sample period, Yukos was involved in another dramatic event – a 
failed merger with another Russian oil company, Sibneft. The merger was officially announced 
in April 22, 2003; Sibneft announced a break-up of the deal in November 28, 2003. The 
exclusion of the merger announcement date from the sample does not affect the results. 
In the cross-sectional analysis, we use two variables as main proxies for the company-
specific exposures to political risk: (i) the total common stock ownership stake of the federal and 
regional governments at the end of 2002, and (ii) the Transparency&Disclosure (T&D) score by 
Standard&Poors, as of August 13, 2002. Several other variables such as industry dummies, 
dummy equal to 1 for stocks with ADRs traded at NYSE, the company’s market capitalization, 
and fraction of shares sold at loans-for-shares auctions are used as controls. 
                                                 
14 These are news affecting a person who is a Yukos’ employee rather than the company. The most prominent 
examples are arrests of Yukos top managers based on charges unrelated to the company. Interestingly, there are no 
employee-related news initiated by the non-law-enforcement agencies. 
15 The last two groups intersect, as there are 7 negative company-related events involving both types of 
agencies. 
16 We used daily close prices in MICEX (“Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange”) for most of the stocks. 
For four stocks (MTS, VimpelCom, Golden Telecom, and Wimm-Bill-Dann) that were primarily traded in NYSE, 
we used the corresponding ADR close prices.  
17 The S&P/RUX index is computed by the Index Agency RTS-Interfax in cooperation with Standard&Poors. 
It is a market-capitalization-weighted index of the Russian companies traded in the RTS (“Russian Trading 
System”) Stock Exchange and Moscow Stock Exchange. Currently, the S&P/RUX index comprises 57 stocks.   11
Our final sample includes 25 common stocks of large Russian companies that were 
actively traded during the sample period and had T&D score. Table 1 shows their descriptive 
statistics. Even though the five largest companies are from the oil and gas sector, other industries 
such utilities (6 companies), telecoms (5 companies), machinery, and metallurgy (both with 2 
companies) are also well-represented. The government-owned companies are concentrated in the 
utilities and telecoms; the federal government effectively controls the gas monopolist Gazprom 
with a 38% stake and the largest retail bank Sberbank with a 64% stake. The T&D scores range 
from 0.14 for Avtovaz, which is a private auto-making company and 0.17 for Rostovenergo, a 
state-owned utility company, to 0.77 for the leading private mobile operator MTS. On average, 
the T&D scores are higher for private companies than for the government-owned ones (0.4 and 
0.3, respectively).  
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the market index and Yukos prices during the sample 
period (both normalized to 100 in the beginning). It is clearly seen from the figure that Yukos 
stock price was ahead of the market index until the arrests of Yukos’ CFO Platon Lebedev and 
CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which led to the sharp falls in stock price in July 3, 2003, and 
October 27, 2003, respectively. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the market index and Yukos returns, which allow us 
to draw some preliminary conclusions. During the sample period, the Russian stock market was 
characterized by high return and volatility: an average return of 0.18% and standard deviation of 
1.93% in daily terms. Yukos stock had a slightly higher return (0.21%) and much higher volatility 
(2.74%). Days with Yukos events were even more volatile: positive news was associated with 
very high returns, while negative news brought prices down. This effect applied both to Yukos 
and to the market index, proving that Yukos events had an overall market impact. 
We carry out a preliminary analysis of the impact of government-related news on Yukos 
returns using a control portfolio, which is a value-weighted portfolio of four other large Russian 
oil companies: Lukoil, Sibneft, Tatneft, and Surgutneftegaz (see Table 1). During the sample 
period, the control portfolio had an average daily return of 0.18% p.a., which rose to 1.55% and 
fell to -0.78% during the days with positive and negative events, respectively (see Table 2). 
However, these swings were less pronounced than those for Yukos, as its average abnormal 
return (defined as the difference between Yukos’ return and control portfolio’s return), close to 
zero during the whole sample period, increased to 0.78% in response to positive news and   12
decreased to -1.02% after negative news. The Yukos’ stock price sensitivity to political news was 
the highest with respect to the employee-related news initiated by the law enforcement agencies, 
which were associated with -1.27% abnormal return which once again proves the political nature 
of risks faced by the company and incorporated by investors in its market valuation.  
4.  The reaction of Yukos shares to political news 
In this section, we investigate the reaction of Yukos stock price to the involvement of the 
state agencies, using time series analysis and employing the market model as a benchmark. The 
basic model is as follows: 
RY,t = α0 + α1Post + α2Negt + (β0 + β1Post + β2Negt) RM,t + εt,    (1) 
where RY,t and RM,t are returns of Yukos and market index
18 in day t; Pos and Neg are dummy 
variables equal to 1 in the case of positive and negative events, respectively. Thus, α1 and α2 
measure the impact of positive and negative news on the level of Yukos returns, while β1 and β2 
measure changes in its systematic risk. In all subsequent regressions, we compute Newey-West 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
The estimation results (see columns 2-3 of Table 3) reinforce the preliminary conclusions 
we made in the previous section. We find that negative events are associated with highly 
significant negative daily abnormal returns in the order of -1.25%. Both types of news lead to a 
significantly higher market risk: beta increases by 0.9 in response to positive events and by 0.51 
after negative news. Thus, negative events primarily influence the level of returns (Yukos stock 
falls more than the market does), while positive events increase the degree of Yukos’ co-
movement with the market (Yukos and market prices rise approximately on par in response to 
good news). 
In order to check the robustness of our findings to the presence of major events such as top 
managers’ arrests, we define an additional dummy variable Arrest equal to one during the days 
of the arrests of Yukos’ top managers and shareholders, Platon Lebedev and Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky (July 3 and October 27, 2003). In the regression 
                                                 
18 In the regression analysis, we use an equally-weighted index of 47 most liquid Russian stocks rather than 
S&P/RUX, which is a value-weighted market index, to avoid the erroneous correlation between the stock price of a 
large company and its market beta (a large fall in stock price implies a decrease in its weight in the value-weighted 
market index and, as a consequence, a decrease in beta). The results stay qualitatively the same when we use 
S&P/RUX as the market index.   13
RY,t = α0 + α1Post + α2Negt + α3NegtArrestt          
+ (β0 + β1Post + β2Negt+ β3NegtArrestt) RM,t + εt,     (2) 
α3 and β3 measure the difference between market reaction to Yukos top managers’ arrests and 
other negative events.  
The estimation results demonstrate that our general findings are robust and not driven by a 
few major events, such as the arrests of Yukos’ top managers. Other negative events lead to the 
daily abnormal return of -1.14%, while arrests implied further 3% decline in price (see columns 
4-5 in Table 3). 
In order to study the specifics of market reaction to different types of news, we define two 
additional dummy variables: Pers equals one when the news affected a person (a Yukos’ 
employee rather than the company) and Comp is equal to one if the charges were directed against 
the company. To separate the impact of different types of state agencies, we introduce two more 
dummies: Force and Other that are equal to one if one of the law enforcement agencies or one of 
other state agencies was mentioned in the news, respectively. Since we do not have many 
positive events, we study interaction effects between the additional dummy variables and NegD. 
The regression is as follows:  
RY,t = α0 + α1Post + α4NegtPerstForcet + α5NegtComptForcet + α6NegtComptOthert    
+(β0 + β1Post + β4NegtPerstForcet + β5NegtComptForcet + β6NegtComptOthert) RM,t + εt.
 (3) 
From the three types of events, negative employee-related news initiated by the law 
enforcement agencies appear to be the most important, driving down the level of company 
returns by 1.2% and increasing beta by 0.43 (see columns 6-7 in Table 3). The fact that the 
company-related charges have no significant impact on Yukos stock price seems puzzling. 
Apparently, the market perceives the personal charges as a much better signal about the future of 
Yukos. 
5.  The reaction of other companies to Yukos events 
The preliminary analysis in section 3 demonstrated a strong market-wide reaction to Yukos 
events. In this section, we investigate whether there are systematic differences in the reaction of 
individual companies to Yukos events related to the company-specific exposures to political risk.    14
We run pooled cross-sectional regressions of stock returns on proxies for the company-
specific political risk exposure as well as Yukos returns interacted with the proxies: 
Ri,t = a0+a1GVTi+a2TDi+a3GVTiTDi+(b0+b1GVTi+b2TDi+b3GVTiTDi)RY,t+εt, (4) 
where Ri,t is company i’s return in day t; GVTi and TDi denote the government’s common stock 
ownership and T&D score of company i, respectively. As we will see, the impact of the T&D 
score is opposite for private and government-owned companies; this difference is captured by the 
coefficient on the interaction effect between GVTi and TDi. In this model, we allow the 
coefficients on political risk proxies to be greater for more important events, as measured by 
Yukos return, RY,t.
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This regression is estimated for different subsets of the events: positive, negative, negative 
employee-related, negative company-related with the law enforcement agencies, negative 
company-related with the non-law-enforcement agencies, and finally negative with Yukos return 
below -2% (there were 19 events of this type). Table 4 reports the results. 
Our main inference is based on the estimation results for the subset of all negative events. 
We observe that the sensitivity of both private and government-owned companies’ stock prices 
to Yukos’ negative events rises with the absolute value of Yukos return. For private companies, 
this sensitivity is significantly lower for higher levels of transparency. For example, if we 
compare the least and the most transparent private companies, Avtovaz and MTS, an incremental 
1% fall in Yukos price will lead to the additional 0.8% fall in the stock price for the former and 
mere 0.1% fall for the latter. For an average private company (with T&D of 0.4) or an average 
state-controlled company (with the government stake of 50% and T&D of 0.3), this will lead to 
approximately 0.5% reduction in stock price. However, higher transparency of the government-
owned companies leads to an increase in the sensitivity to Yukos return, which is contrary to the 
findings for private companies. Thus, less transparent private companies and more transparent 
government-owned companies seems to be more prone to the political risks. 
Looking at the estimation results for the different subsets of negative events, we observe 
similar patterns. Once again, the negative employee-related events involving the law 
                                                 
19 This approach is similar to that by Fisman (2001) who used the return on the Indonesian stock index net of 
South Asian effects as a measure of the importance of the event. We obtain similar results when we use the market 
return instead of Yukos return.   15
enforcement agencies seem to be the most important, in this case – not only for Yukos, but also 
for other companies. 
We employ a number of robustness checks, adding several control variables to the model 
(4), one at a time: oil and energy industry dummies, ADR dummy for stocks with ADRs traded 
at NYSE, the log of company’s market capitalization, and the fraction of shares sold at loans-for-
shares auctions. Neither of these variables changes our main results. Oil companies and 
companies that took part in the notorious loans-for-shares auctions seem to be more sensitive to 
Yukos events. However, in a regression adding both variables to the main specification (4), the 
oil industry dummy sensitivity coefficient remains significant only in the subset of negative 
company-related events involving non-law-enforcement agencies, whereas the loans-for-shares 
variable has a significantly positive sensitivity coefficient in the subsets of negative events 
initiated by the law-enforcement agencies. Thus, the actions of such non-law-enforcement 
agencies as the Ministry of Natural Resources (e.g., revoking of the license) seem to have an 
industry-wide impact, whereas the law-enforcement agencies’ actions matter especially for large 
privatized companies, especially those that took part in the notorious loans-for-shares auctions.  
The coefficients on other control variables were insignificant.
   As another robustness 
check, we also estimated the model (4) including fixed time effects; this did not materially 
change our results. 
6.  The stock price behavior of Lukoil and Gazprom 
In the final part of the paper, we extend our analysis of political risks to two other major 
Russian companies, Lukoil and Gazprom. After the decline in Yukos’ market capitalization due 
to its prosecution, Lukoil became the largest oil producer in Russia. It is a private company, 
although the government held a minor (7.6%) stake until September 29, 2004, when this stake 
was sold to ConocoPhillips. Gazprom holds a virtual monopoly in the Russian gas market and 
has the largest market capitalization in Russia (see Table 1). The state owns a major (38%) stake 
in Gazprom, which allows the government effectively control the company. We study political 
risks of the two companies along two lines. First of all, we partly replicate the preceding analysis 
(models (1) and (3)) for Lukoil and Gazprom for their own positive and negative events. 
Secondly, we investigate whether Yukos’ events had an impact on other companies’ stock market   16
performance. The following two regressions include dummies both for Lukoil (or Gazprom) own 
events and Yukos events. In the regression 
Rt = α0 + α1Post + α2Negt + α7PosYt + α8NegYt         
+ (β0 + β1Post + β2Negt+ β7PosYt + β8NegYt) RM,t + εt,     (5) 
where the event dummies are defined as before and ‘Y’ denotes variables referring to Yukos, the 
coefficients α1, α2, β1, and β2 measure market reaction to company’s own news, while α7, α8, β7, 
and β8 show the impact of Yukos’ events on other companies (Lukoil or Gazprom). We extend 
this model separating the impact of negative news due to the law enforcement agencies and other 
state agencies: 
Rt = α0 + α1Post + α5NegtForcet + α6NegtOthert         
+ α7PosYt + α9NegYtForceYt + α10NegYtOtherYt       
+ (β0 + β1Post + β5NegtForcet + β6NegtOthert         
+ β7PosYt + β9NegYtForceYt + β10NegYtOtherYt) RM,t + εt             (6) 
where the event dummies are defined along similar lines. 
Tables 5 and 6 present results of the regression analysis for Lukoil and Gazprom, 
respectively. Similarly to Yukos,  Lukoil’s returns are primarily affected by negative news 
involving the law enforcement agencies, which lead to a significant decline in the level of daily 
returns by 0.72%. It seems that the market seriously considers the possibility of yet another case 
against a private oil company. Negative news for Lukoil also increases its systematic risk by 
0.41. Negative Yukos news had a marginally significant impact (at the 10% level) both on the 
level of Lukoil’s returns, which go down by 0.44%, and its beta, which falls by 0.22. Separating 
the impact of different types of Yukos news, we see that Yukos news involving other agencies 
primarily affect the level of Lukoil’s returns. It seems that actions of such agencies as the 
Ministry of Natural Resources directed against Yukos convey a signal about the Ministry’s 
inentions concerning the whole oil industry. However, Lukoil’s systematic risk is primarily 
driven by Yukos person-related news due to the law enforcement agencies. It seems that investors 
take into account two opposite effects: the probability of Yukos’ scenario being applied to Lukoil, 
which is also a private oil company, and decrease in competition in the oil industry after the 
possible weakening or even bankruptcy of Yukos.  
The nature of political risks for Gazprom is very different. Negative news due to the law 
enforcement agencies have no significant impact on the level of returns or their systematic risk,   17
which is very logical given that Gazprom is controlled by the government. However, negative 
news involving the other state agencies lead to a significant increase in the level of Gazprom’s 
daily returns by 0.64% and significant decrease in its market beta by 0.54. Such market reaction 
may be explained by the relatively inefficient management of Gazprom, which is disciplined 
when the respective authorities such as Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Anti-
Monopoly Policy, and State Auditing Chamber turn their attention to the company. Clearly, this 
effect is company-specific, which explains a decrease in Gazprom’s systematic risk. Yukos 
events have a rather peculiar impact on Gazprom’s stock market performance. Most 
interestingly, positive Yukos news are associated with a significant decrease both in the level and 
in the systematic risk of Gazprom’s returns. This is consistent with the view that Gazprom could 
profit from the break-up of Yukos, which was proven recently at the sale of Yukos’ major asset, 
Yuganskneftegaz.  
7.  Conclusion 
In finance, the term ‘political risk’ usually applies to a country as whole, being associated 
with possible changes in regulation, trade agreements, etc. This paper provides strong evidence 
that the involvement of state agencies (in particular, law enforcement agencies) is still a very 
important company-specific factor affecting returns in the Russian stock market.  
In the case of Yukos, negative events associated primarily with law enforcement agencies’ 
actions against the company’s employees caused significant drops in stock prices, with the daily 
abnormal returns in the order of -1.1%. This effect was especially pronounced in case of the 
major events, such as the arrests of Yukos’ top managers, when the single-day price drops were 
up to 15% and the abnormal return was in the order of -10%. Both positive and negative news 
about personal charges and arrests implied a significant increase in the company’s systematic 
risk, as the other companies’ stock prices also reacted strongly to Yukos events.  
Apparently, Yukos events are interpreted a signal about the possible propagation of the 
prosecution scenario to other companies. We find that stock prices of less transparent private 
companies and more transparent government-owned companies are more sensitive to Yukos’ 
events, especially the personal-related charges by the law enforcement agencies. In addition, 
companies that took part in the notorious loans-for-shares auctions are more sensitive to the 
actions of the law enforcement agencies. Writing in 2004, William Buiter, the Chief Economist   18
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, observed that “the Yukos affair in 
Russia is a timely reminder of the vulnerability of property rights acquired through a 
privatization process that lacks legitimacy.” Our findings are consistent with the view that they 
face a higher risk of expropriation through the use of such political instruments as selective tax 
enforcement.  
The stock market performance of Lukoil, the second-largest Russian oil producer was 
significantly affected by negative news concerning Yukos. Lukoil’s own negative news due to the 
law enforcement agencies brought down its abnormal return by 0.7%. However, the involvement 
of the state agencies, such as Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy, 
and State Auditing Chamber, may be beneficial for the inefficiently managed state companies. 
For Gazprom, a government-controlled gas monopolist, this led to a 0.6% increase in the daily 
abnormal return. It stock price was also affected by Yukos events, although in different way 
consistent with the view that Gazprom would profit from Yukos’ bankruptcy. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of selected Russian companies 
 
The table reports market capitalization (as of November 27, 2003), the total common stock 
ownership stake of federal and regional governments (as of the end of 2002), and 
transparency&disclosure (T&D) score by Standard&Poors (as of August 13, 2002) of 25 Russian 
companies in the sample. 
 
Company Industry 
Market cap, 
$ mln 
Government 
stake, %  T&D 
Gazprom Gas  30133  38%  0.26 
Yukos Oil  26931  0%  0.52 
Surgutneftegaz Oil  18995  0%  0.34 
Lukoil Oil  18564  8%  0.44 
Sibneft Oil  11480  0%  0.39 
RAO UES  Utilities  10695  53%  0.43 
MTS Telecoms  8222  0%  0.77 
Norilskiy nikel  Metallurgy  7369  0%  0.42 
Sberbank Banking  3635  64%  0.28 
VimpelCom Telecoms  2802 0%  0.49 
Severstal Metallurgy  2450  0%  0.25 
Tatneft Oil  2261  31%  0.33 
Mosenergo Utilities  1827  54%  0.39 
Rostelecom Telecoms  1414  51%  0.48 
Uralsviazinform Telecoms  1023  53%  0.29 
Golden telecom  Telecoms  1011  0%  0.49 
Wimm-Bill-Dann Food  &  beverages  829  0% 0.73 
Avtovaz Machinery  654  2%  0.14 
Aeroflot Airlines  596  51%  0.36 
Irkutskenergo Utilities  550 40%  0.3 
OMZ Machinery  253  0%  0.26 
Samaraenergo Utilities  215  49%  0.38 
Krasnoyarskenergo Utilities  206  52%  0.25 
Sverdlovenergo Utilities  203  49%  0.23 
Rostovenergo Utilities  94 49%  0.17 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
This table shows mean and standard deviation of daily returns on market index (S&P/RUX), 
Yukos, normal and abnormal returns during the overall sample period (January 1, 2002 to 
November 27, 2003), days with positive events, days with negative events, days with employee-
related events, days with company-related events involving law enforcement agencies, and days 
with company-related events involving non-law-enforcement agencies. The normal return is a 
return of the value-weighted control portfolio of Lukoil, Sibneft, Tatneft, and Surgutneftegaz, the 
four largest Russian oil companies (besides Yukos). The abnormal return is the difference 
between Yukos return and control portfolio’s return. 
 
      Negative events 
     
Overall
 
 
Positive 
events 
 
All 
 
Pers-
Forc 
Comp-
Forc 
Comp-
Other 
S&P/RUX  Mean 0.18  0.84  -0.63  -1.39  -0.25  0.29 
  St.dev. 1.93  1.75  2.82  3.56  2.47  2.07 
              
YUKOS  Mean 0.21  2.33  -1.80  -2.74  -1.11 -0.90 
  St.dev. 2.74  3.41  3.91  4.71  3.54  3.08 
              
Normal return  Mean 0.18  1.55  -0.78  -1.47  -0.51 -0.03 
  St.dev. 2.37  2.64  2.85  3.42  2.66  2.28 
              
Abnormal return  Mean 0.03  0.78  -1.02  -1.27  -0.60 -0.87 
   St.dev 1.68  1.67  2.09  2.53 1.91  1.62 
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Table 3. Regressions of Yukos returns on market returns and event variables  
 
This table presents results of the regressions (1) to (3) of daily Yukos returns on market returns 
and event dummies during the period from January 1, 2002 to November 27, 2003. The event 
dummies are defined as follows: Pos and Neg are equal to one in the case of positive and 
negative event, respectively; Arrest is equal to one during the days surrounding the arrests of 
Yukos’ top managers and shareholders; Pers and Comp are equal to one when the news affects 
Yukos’ employee and the company; Force and Other are equal to one if a law enforcement 
agencies and other state agency is mentioned in the news, respectively. The t-statistics are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (with 5 lags). 
 
   Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Const  0.05 0.58 0.05 0.58 0.03 0.33 
Pos  0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.52 1.04 
Neg  -1.25 -4.25 -1.14 -4.27     
Neg*Arrest   -2.99  -12.10     
Neg*Pers*Force      -1.20  -2.93 
Neg*Comp*Force      -0.49  -1.00 
Neg*Comp*Other      -1.08  -1.59 
Rm  1.17 14.43  1.17 14.43  1.18 14.19 
Rm*Pos  0.90 3.55 0.90 3.55 0.89 3.50 
Rm*Neg  0.51 3.44 0.39 2.40     
Rm*Neg*Arrest  0.12 0.86     
Rm*Neg*Pers*Force     0.43  2.41 
Rm*Neg*Comp*Force     0.57  1.31 
Rm*Neg*Comp*Other     0.11  0.22 
Adjusted R2  0.56  0.563  0.551 
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Table 4. Pooled regressions of stock returns during the event days 
 
This table presents results of the pooled cross-sectional regression (4) of stock returns on the 
company-specific political risk proxies as well as Yukos returns interacted with proxies during 
the period from January 1, 2002 to November 27, 2003. The t-statistics are heteroscedasticity-
adjusted. GVTi and TDi denote the government’s common stock ownership and T&D score of 
company i, respectively. Columns 3 to 8 report results of the regression estimated in different 
subsets of the events: positive, negative, negative employee-related, negative company-related 
with the law enforcement agencies, negative company-related with the non-law-enforcement 
agencies, and major negative (with Yukos return below -2%).  
 
      Negative events 
     
Positive 
events 
 
All 
 
Pers-
Force 
Comp-
Force 
Comp-
Other 
Major 
 
Const  Coef -2.19  1.19  1.46  0.86 1.66  2.01 
  t-stat -3.37  3.35  2.65  1.72 3.04  2.71 
              
Gvt  Coef 6.29  -2.07  -3.83  -0.78  -4.42  -7.05 
  t-stat 1.42  -1.49  -1.70  -0.37  -1.84  -2.62 
              
TD  Coef 3.35  -1.91  -3.21  -1.09  -2.73  -3.73 
  t-stat 2.81  -2.65  -2.58  -1.05  -2.73  -2.64 
              
Gvt*TD  Coef -11.81  5.47  11.64  0.79 13.09  19.13 
  t-stat -1.03  1.52  2.00  0.15 2.15  2.83 
              
Ry  Coef 0.92  0.95  1.18  0.72  0.76  1.06 
  t-stat 4.11  9.14  8.94  4.98  3.79  8.59 
              
Ry*Gvt  Coef -0.93  -1.29  -1.93  -0.56  -0.97  -1.89 
  t-stat -1.03  -3.31  -3.90  -0.77  -1.12  -4.04 
              
Ry*TD  Coef -0.79  -1.22  -1.73  -0.69  -1.01  -1.51 
  t-stat -2.04  -6.30  -8.01  -2.26  -2.87  -6.92 
              
Ry*Gvt*TD  Coef 1.82  4.07  5.59  2.29  3.89  5.80 
  t-stat 0.77  4.20  4.68  1.22  1.84  5.02 
              
# observations   234  889  345  400  298  404 
Adjusted R2     0.22  0.35  0.44  0.27  0.22  0.41 
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Table 5. Regressions of LUKOIL returns on market returns and event variables  
 
This table presents results of the regressions (1), (5), and (6) of daily Lukoil’s returns on market 
returns and event variables during the period from January 1, 2002 to November 27, 2003. The 
event dummies are defined as follows: Pos and Neg are equal to one in the case of positive and 
negative event, respectively; Force and Other are equal to one if a law enforcement agencies and 
other state agency is mentioned in the news, respectively. ‘Y’ denotes variables referring to 
Yukos; Pers and Comp are equal to one when the news affects Yukos’ employee and the 
company, respectively. The t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
(with 5 lags). 
 
    Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Const  -0.07 -0.91 -0.07 -0.94 -0.05 -0.58 -0.05 -0.66 
Pos  -0.19 -0.26 -0.19 -0.26 -0.18 -0.27 -0.23 -0.33 
Neg  -0.24 -0.92      -0.21 -0.82     
Neg*Force     -0.72  -2.02     -0.76  -2.10 
Neg*Other     -0.01  -0.05     0.02  0.06 
PosY       -0.19  -0.42  -0.18  -0.40 
NegY       -0.44  -1.80    
Neg*Pers*ForceY         - 0 . 1 8   - 0 . 6 7  
Neg*Comp*ForceY         0.06  0.13 
Neg*Comp*OtherY         - 1 . 0 6   - 2 . 0 8  
Rm  1.11 20.91  1.11 20.91  1.12 20.27  1.12 20.12 
Rm*Pos  -0.19 -0.77 -0.19 -0.77 -0.24 -1.06     
Rm*Neg  0.41 2.57      0.50 2.82     
Rm*Neg*Force     0.26  1.48     -0.22  -0.89 
Rm*Neg*Other     0.35  1.23     0.13  0.30 
Rm*PosY       0.38  1.56  0.39  1.14 
Rm*NegY       -0.22  -1.71    
Rm*Neg*Pers*ForceY         0.38  1.57 
Rm*Neg*Comp*ForceY         - 0 . 2 7   - 2 . 8 0  
Rm*Neg*Comp*OtherY         0.17  0.35 
Adjusted R2  0.55 0.54 0.55 0.55 
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Table 6. Regressions of GAZPROM returns on market returns and event variables  
 
This table presents results of the regressions (1), (5), and (6) of daily Gazprom’s returns on 
market returns and event variables during the period from January 1, 2002 to November 27, 
2003. The event dummies are defined as follows: Pos and Neg are equal to one in the case of 
positive and negative event, respectively; Force and Other are equal to one if a law enforcement 
agencies and other state agency is mentioned in the news, respectively. ‘Y’ denotes variables 
referring to Yukos; Pers and Comp are equal to one when the news affects Yukos’ employee and 
the company, respectively. The t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (with 5 lags). 
 
   Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Const  -0.04 -0.44 -0.04 -0.43 -0.05 -0.47 -0.04 -0.43 
Pos  0.74 1.63 0.73 1.62 0.66 1.82 0.69 1.69 
Neg  0.17 0.43      0.09 0.22     
Neg*Force     -0.12  -0.26     0.12  0.25 
Neg*Other     0.64  2.23     0.52  1.65 
PosY       -0.92  -1.85  -1.02  -2.03 
NegY       0.13  0.36    
Neg*Pers*ForceY         - 0 . 1 3   - 0 . 1 9  
Neg*Comp*ForceY         0.61  1.50 
Neg*Comp*OtherY         - 0 . 5 1   - 1 . 3 0  
Rm  1.06 13.12  1.06 13.14  1.08 11.97  1.08 12.13 
Rm*Pos  0.66 1.34 0.66 1.34 0.32 0.71     
Rm*Neg  -0.25 -1.14      -0.33 -1.39     
Rm*Neg*Force     0.74  0.99     0.26  0.61 
Rm*Neg*Other     -0.54  -3.61     0.89  1.13 
Rm*PosY       0.74  1.62  -0.70  -3.50 
Rm*NegY       -0.11  -0.73    
Rm*Neg*Pers*ForceY         0.83  2.04 
Rm*Neg*Comp*ForceY         - 0 . 2 9   - 1 . 9 8  
Rm*Neg*Comp*OtherY         0.47  1.53 
Adjusted  R2  0.42  0.423 0.419 0.425 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. The dynamics of Yukos and market index in 2002-2003 
This graph shows the dynamics of daily values of Yukos stock and market index during the period from January 1, 2002 to November 27, 
2003 (both normalized to 100 in the beginning). The dates of positive events are marked as yellow cubes on the top of the graph, while the 
dates of negative events are marked as red diamonds on the bottom of the graph.  
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
0
3
/
0
1
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
2
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
3
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
4
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
5
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
6
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
7
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
8
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
9
/
0
2
0
3
/
1
0
/
0
2
0
3
/
1
1
/
0
2
0
3
/
1
2
/
0
2
0
3
/
0
1
/
0
3
0
3
/
0
2
/
0
3
0
3
/
0
3
/
0
3
0
3
/
0
4
/
0
3
0
3
/
0
5
/
0
3
0
3
/
0
6
/
0
3
0
3
/
0
7
/
0
3
0
3
/
0
8
/
0
3
0
3
/
0
9
/
0
3
0
3
/
1
0
/
0
3
0
3
/
1
1
/
0
3
0
3
/
1
2
/
0
3
Days
P
r
i
c
e
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
YUKOS S&P/RUX PosD NegD*
   
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF  5/05/05 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 772: Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the 
Yukos Affair  
Alexei Goriaev and Konstantin 
Sonin 
May 2005 
No. 771: Non-Linear Exchange Rate Dynamics in Target Zones: A 
Bumpy Road Towards A Honeymoon 
Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Balázs 
Égert, and Ronald MacDonald 
May 2005 
No. 770: Equilibrium Exchange Rates in Southeastern Europe, Russia, 
Ukraine and Turkey: Healthy or (Dutch) Diseased? 
Balázs Égert  May 2005 
No. 769: Equilibrium Exchange Rates in Central and Eastern Europe: A 
Meta-Regression Analysis 
Balázs Égert and László Halpern 
 
May 2005 
No. 768: Testing for inflation convergence between the Euro Zone 
and its CEE  partners 
Imed Drine and Christophe Rault  Apr. 2005 
No. 767: Labor Mobility during Transition: Evidence from the Czech 
Republic 
Jan Fidrmuc  Apr. 2005 
No. 766: Formation of social capital in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Understanding the gap vis-à-vis developed countries 
Jan Fidrmuc and Klarita Gërxhani  Apr. 2005 
No. 765: Do Regional Integration Agreements Increase Business-Cycle 
Convergence?  Evidence From APEC and NAFTA 
Viviana Fernandez and Ali M. 
Kutan 
Apr. 2005 
No. 764: State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: A Study 
in the Economics of the Informal Sector 
Maxim Bouev  Apr. 2005 
No. 763: The Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle Revisited: An “European-
Regional” Perspective 
Jérôme Hericourt and Mathilde 
Maurel 
Apr. 2005 
No. 762: Transatlantic Differences in Labour Markets Changes in Wage 
and Non-Employment Structures in the 1980s and the 1990s 
Patrick A. Puhani  Mar. 2005 
No. 761: Resolution, Recovery and Survival: The Evolution of Payment 
Disputes in Post-Socialist Europe 
William Pyle  Mar. 2005 
No. 760: Official Foreign Exchange Interventions in the Czech 
Republic: Did They Matter? 
Balázs Égert and Luboš Komárek  Mar. 2005 
No. 759: Assessing Market Expectations on Exchange Rates and 
Inflation: A Pilot Forecasting System for Bulgaria 
Michael Berlemann, Kalina 
Dimitrova, & Nikolay Nenovsky 
Mar. 2005 
No. 758: Attitudes and Performance: An Analysis of Russian Workers  Susan J. Linz and Anastasia 
Semykina 
Mar. 2005 
No. 757: Barter, Credit, and Welfare: A theoretical inquiry into the 
barter phenomenon in Russia 
José Noguera and Susan J. Linz 
 
Mar. 2005 
No. 756: Sorting, Selection, and Transformation of the Return to 
College Education In China 
Belton M. Fleisher, Haizheng Li, 
Shi Li, and Xiaojun Wang 
Mar. 2005 
No. 755: Foreign Exchange Interventions in Emerging Europe: 
Should We Give a Damn? The Case of Croatia and Turkey 
Balázs Égert and Maroje Lang 
 
Mar. 2005 
No. 754: Targeting Relative Inflation Forecast as Monetary Policy 
Framework for Adopting Euro 
Lucjan T. Orlowski  Feb. 2005 
No. 753: Internet Entrepreneurship: Networks and Performance of 
Internet Ventures In China 
Bat Batjargal  Feb. 2005 
No. 752: Network Triads: Transitivity, Referral and Venture Capital 
Decisions in China and Russia 
Bat Batjargal  Feb. 2005 
No. 751: Software Entrepreneurship: Knowledge Networks and 
Performance Of Software Ventures In China and Russia 
Bat Batjargal  Feb. 2005 
No. 750: Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does 
Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value? 
Lihui Tian and Saul Estrin  Feb. 2005 
No. 749: Financial Development and Technology  Solomon Tadesse  Feb. 2005 
No. 748: Banking Fragility and Disclosure: International Evidence  Solomon Tadesse  Feb. 2005 
No. 747: Consolidation, Scale Economies and Technological Change in 
Japanese Banking 
Solomon Tadesse  Feb. 2005 
No. 746: Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of Europe’s Regional 
Liberalization Agreements 
Yener Kandogan  Feb. 2005 
No. 745: Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy  Christa Hainz  Feb. 2005 
 